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ABSTRACT 
A RECOMMENDATION FOR THE CALIFORNIA DAIRY SYSTEM REFORM 
BASED ON A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DAIRY MARKET STRUCTURING 
AND PRICING SYSTEMS OF SEVEN LEADING DAIRY INDUSTRIES IN 2014. 
MEREDITH FRISIUS 
MARCH 2014 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the production and regulatory systems 
utilized by the largest dairy producers around the world in order to determine the best 
practices for dairy market structuring and pricing systems which California could model 
as the current dairy pricing system reforms are established. In this study, the California 
Order, the Federal Milk Marketing Orders, Idaho, Canada, European Union, New 
Zealand, and Australia will serve as the systems reviewed, and their procedural policies 
will serve as reference points in the following recommendation for the California dairy 
Industry.  
The recommended Auction System is covered in detail, and is designed to enable 
California to replace the out of date regulation system currently in place. Adoption of the 
Auction System will promote domestic and international expansion of the California 
dairy industry. The proposed Auction System addresses the current dysfunctions plaguing 
the dairy industry today. This paper examines the current realities of the California dairy 
industry, and how the current regulatory system has contributed to today’s realities. 
Finally, the paper briefly examined the three most popular recommendation for California 
reform to date.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background of Study 
 Since the transportation revolution of the early 1800’s, the globalization of 
markets has steadily increased. Today all industries, agriculture included, have to adapt to 
the reality and impact of globalization. The products produced by California Agriculture 
no longer affect only those living in California and throughout the Unites States, but 
impact people living around the globe. The influence of the international market 
pressures has proven to be a new challenge leading to many structural changes to the 
food system worldwide. As the food system has become globalized, it has made the need 
for regulatory change in the California dairy industry apparent. As of the publishing of 
this paper, the California dairy industry continues to be regulated by systems that began 
development in the 1920’s during a time of localized markets. As the food system 
globalized these regulations have become outdated and structural changes are on the 
horizon for the California dairy industry. With change eminent in California, a thorough 
analysis of the current regulatory systems has been conducted. As the realities of the 
dairy industry and regulatory system have been examined, there has been widespread 
debate about the correct path to choose in order to ensure future success.  
For many years there has been discussion throughout the California dairy industry 
regarding the current regulatory systems, and those system’s effects on the industry. The 
current regulatory systems in California were developed decades ago during a different 
time. With new political feelings, advanced technologies, product innovation, and global 
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market expansion, the current systems have proved to be a hindrance to forward progress. 
As the world’s population continues to increase and the middle class continues to expand, 
the global demand for dairy products is increasing. According to the United States 
Department of Agriculture, in order to meet the increasing demand for dairy products 
worldwide, dairy production will need to increase between 1.65% and 2.45% annually 
year-over-year on an ongoing basis (USDA, 2014).  
The California dairy industry is seen internationally as one of the dairy markets 
capable of the great expansion needed to meet global dairy demands. As the dairy 
industry worldwide looks to meet the rising demand, the need for structural reform in the 
California dairy industry has grown even more apparent. In September of 2012, 
California Agriculture Secretary, Karen Ross, announced the formation of the California 
Dairy Future Task Force. This task force was developed to aid Secretary Ross in finding 
a long-term solution for the California dairy industry. The focus of the task force’s efforts 
is to develop a suggestion for a governmental reform which will eliminate the issues 
present within the dairy industry due to regulation, and to enable the California dairy 
industry to step into the international market as a key player.  
This paper examines the production and regulatory systems utilized by the largest 
dairy producers around the world. The objective of this examination has been to 
determine the best practices for dairy market structuring and pricing systems upon which 
California could model as the upcoming dairy pricing system reforms are established. In 
this study, the California Order, the Federal Milk Marketing Orders, Idaho, Canada, 
European Union, New Zealand, and Australia have served as the systems reviewed, and 
their procedural policies have served as reference points in the recommendations made 
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for the California dairy industry. The paper also briefly examines the most popular 
recommendation for California reform to date. Note this paper and its proposal have 
focused on those regulations specific to California, and they have not touch on the federal 
support or export programs. 
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Chapter 2 
REVIEW OF DAIRY SYSTEMS  
 
What is Milk? 
Before one can discuss the current milk pricing systems utilized around the globe, 
it is vital to understand what milk truly is.  By first examining the question “what is 
milk,” one will better understand the issues that face the dairy industry based on the raw 
material utilize. There are five key components to milk production which makes it unique 
from other commodities. These five components are: 
1. Milk is a raw multipurpose ingredient that is highly perishable. 
2. Milk is produced 24 hours a day, seven day a week, 365 days a year. 
3. Milk production is in very specific regions based on feed availability, geography 
and climate. 
4. Milk production has seasonal highs and lows which are in direct imbalance with 
consumer demand trends (USDA, 2010). 
5. Milk is a highly nutritious substance which allows for potential milk quality 
issues. Milk needs to be handled properly to keep it from harboring unsafe 
Microbial levels. 
To date, milk is the only major agriculture commodity with government-mandated 
pricing that is different depending on the end product it is being used for. 
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California Milk Market Order Evolution  
Similar to all modern industries, the dairy industry has undergone an enormous 
transformation since the 1900’s. The initial dairy farms in California looked very 
different from the commercial dairies we are accustom to today. Farms in the early days 
of dairy farming were small, inefficient operations which consisted of at most a handful 
of cows alongside multiple other commodities. Today, dairy production represents 
California’s highest-grossing agriculture product at $6.9 billion annually (USDA, 2012). 
In 2013, California had 1,819,760 milking cows on 1,563 farms (USDA, 2012). The 
average California dairy in 2013 machine milked herds of 1,164 milk cows each 
producing an average of 23,457 pounds annually (USDA, 2012). Total milk production in 
2013 was 41.801 billion pounds of milk (USDA, 2012). The California dairy industry has 
grown from little farm steads supporting families and small towns to the largest milk 
producer in the United States today.  
 As the California dairy industry has developed into the large scale production it 
represents today, the industry has undergone numerous regulatory changes to 
accommodate for the developing industry needs. In the late 1800’s prior to regulation, the 
dairy industry was disorderly, it experienced large fluctuation’s in price and in demand, it 
had little to no price discovery mechanisms, and it was plagued by inefficient milk 
movement. Each of these factors pushed the dairy industry towards developing a 
regulator system which would combat these issues.  
 The first step towards the regulation of the dairy industry was not in the form of a 
dairy specific regulation, but in the Capper Volstead Act of 1922 (Western United 
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Dairymen, 2012). The primary purpose of the Capper Volstead Act was to enable 
agricultural producers to market, price, and sell their commodity through private 
cooperatives, rather than individually (Western United Dairymen, 2012). These 
cooperatives where established to represent a group of producers in negotiating and 
establishing payments and purchase prices for those producers they represented. This Act 
allowed dairymen to collectively sell, process, handle and market their milk if they so 
choose (Western United Dairymen, 2012). The ability to unite as one much larger entity 
enabled dairy farmers to gain a significant amount of market control. This market control 
helped to combat some of the market price volatility by providing a market with 
transparency for both producers independently selling product, and those being 
represented by cooperatives. Those farmers who chose to join cooperatives received 
increased bargaining power, a method of price discovery, a consistent home for their 
milk, and financial incentives in the form of tax breaks (Bailey, 1997). Today, 92 years 
after enactment the Capper Volstead Act is still actively enabling cooperative such as 
California Dairies Incorporated, Land-O-Lakes, and Dairgold to thrive in the United 
States. 
 Although the Capper Volstead Act provided significant relief to dairymen, the 
onset of the Great Depression in the early 1930’s made apparent the need for more 
change within the dairy industry. The dairy industry turned to the government for aid in 
saving the failing dairy industry. At this time the federal government responded by 
deeming milk nutritionally essential for humans, and took action to relieve the economic 
hardship of dairy farmers throughout the United States (Bailey, 1997). The first federal 
governments step towards regulating the dairy industry was in enacting temporary 
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regulation aimed at eliminate the surplus of milk that was driving the price of milk 
further and further down. President Roosevelt instructed dairymen to pour milk on the 
ground in order to eliminate the surplus, and to bring the market price back up (Bailey, 
1997). At the time this action was poorly received by the general United States 
population, many of who were starving and suffering for malnutrition, but the action 
saved countless dairy farmers by stabilizing the dairy market. 
 It became clear that change in the dairy industry was essential for the industry’s 
prosperity, and for its long term survival. Industry reports from the years prior to and 
during the onset of the Great Depression reveal that the regulating of the dairy industry 
had eight objectives: 
1. Secure a stable fresh fluid milk supply for consumers. 
2. Accommodate for the nature of milk and milk production; develop programs 
recognizing that although milk is continuous produced, it has seasonal highs and 
lows, there are specific regional requirements, and it is high perishable. 
3. Develop market order between producer, handler, processor, and retailer. 
4. Allow price transparency in order to establish a market value for milk. 
5. Combat the revenue volatility experienced by producers due to raw milk prices 
changing virtually hourly. 
6. Guarantee farmers a minimum price for milk produced. 
7. Guarantee a buyer for milk to avoid disposal or dumping of milk. 
8. Create efficient milk movement to plants which produce products fitting to 
consumers demand. 
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These eight objectives of regulating the dairy industry were implemented in a series of 
Acts. First was the Federal Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933, established by 
the Federal Government. In California the AAA implemented milk marketing agreements 
for Los Angeles, Alameda County, and San Diego (USDA, 2001). The AAA was enacted 
first in these three locations with the intention of expanding the act to other areas within 
California involved in dairy production (USDA, 2001). In 1934, the marketing 
agreements established in California where removed after courts declared them illegal on 
the grounds of Federal regulation of local markets with no interstate commerce 
involvement (USDA, 2001). With this declaration California became removed from the 
Federal Milk Marketing System. It is the Federal Milk Marketing System that still 
governs a majority of the United States’ milk today.  
With no regulation in place, dairymen and dairy distributors in California moved to 
form the necessary regulation to ensure market stability (USDA, 2001). In 1935 
California passed the Young Act regulation to establish a minimum price to be received 
by all dairy producers in California. The Young act made the California Director of 
Agriculture responsible for the establishment of the minimum price paid for raw milk. 
The raw milk price established was based on three standards: 
1. The current and prospective supply and demand relationships for fluid milk 
between producer, processor and consumer. 
2. Assuring a continuous supply of wholesome milk at a reasonable price for 
consumers and producers. 
3. Pricing that regulates a reasonable and sound economic relationship with the price 
of manufacturing grade milk (USDA, 2001). 
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Note that these three standards are the same as the federal standards established by the 
Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement of 1937 (Jesse, et al, 2008).  
The first and second standards where developed to address the federal government’s 
declarations that fluid milk was essential to a nutritional diet. The first and in part the 
second standard where met through volume contracts issued to producers from the 
California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA). These contracts specified the 
exact volume of raw product which a fluid plant was to privately contract to producers in 
order to provide consumers with an adequate supply of fluid milk. The contracts where 
developed based on the population of California, and no fluid milk above the contracted 
amount was permitted for sale. All milk produced above the demands of the fluid market 
was to be unitized in manufactured dairy products.   
The provision of the second standard regarding the requirement for a reasonable 
price, as well as, the requirements of the third standard are met by the system of classified 
pricing. This system establishes a standard for the minimum price paid for raw milk 
based on the end product into which the raw milk is being processed. When classified 
pricing was developed, the number of classes and the categorization of products in each 
class was vastly different from today’s system. This change has come about as the 
advancements in technology have enabled new processed products to emerge onto the 
dairy market. Today the classified pricing system breaks dairy products into five 
categories: 
1. Class 1 - representing fluid milk. 
2. Class 2 - representing cultured products. 
3. Class 3 - representing frozen products. 
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4. Class 4a - representing cheese products. 
5. Class 4b - representing butter and powdered milk products. 
As previously mentioned, the Federal Government deemed that fluid milk was essential 
for good nutrition, and that declaration led to fluid milk being given priority in the 
utilization of raw milk when compared to manufactured products (USDA, 2001). 
Producers servicing the Class 1, fluid market, received the highest price for their milk 
when compared to each of the subsequent classes. The value of raw milk servicing each 
subsequent class generally decreased in direct correlation to the class number which is 
being serviced (CDFA, 2007). The exact formulas which determine the price which each 
Class receives will be discussed later in the detail under the Federal Milk Marketing 
Order Evolution section. 
The Young Act addressed the issue of California dairy producers being unable to sell 
their milk, but it failed to address the issue of product price equality (USDA, 2001). A 
producer generally serviced the processor closet to their dairy, yet under the Young Act, a 
producer servicing a higher Class processor received a higher price than a producer 
servicing a lower Class processor for virtually identical raw products. Two dairy 
producers, with similar milk quality, under this system would not receive comparable 
prices for their milk if one producer shipped to a fluid bottling plant, and the other 
shipped to a cheese plant. This discrepancy lead to a significant amount of disorder 
within the industry. Those producers who lived a great distance from a fluid bottling 
plant would attempt to ship greater distances to receive the premium price from a Class 1 
processor, rather than service non-fluid plant in closer proximity (CDFA, 2007).  This 
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unfair advantage and disorderly practice remained unaddressed in California until the late 
1960’s (CDFA, 2007). 
In the mid 1960’s two events occurred that pushed California towards developing a 
regulatory system to address the price discrepancy that had been experienced by 
producers for over 30 year. The first event was a shift in the market makeup which placed 
a significant amount of pressure on many processing facilities. Due to discrepancy in the 
price producers received for their product, and due to the expense of hauling raw milk 
that was being placed on the producer, many producers chose to open their own 
processing facilities (CDFA, 2007). A vast majority of these facilities serviced Class 1, 
fluid, markets. This vertical production shift in the distribution network caused a 
reduction in the number of Class 1 contracts available. This change to the producer 
operated fluid processing plants impacted the historic distribution system, and many 
commercial plants lost fluid contracting rights from the CDFA. This forced several 
processing plants to switch production to lower Class processing, and forced more 
producers across California to contract to plants utilizing lower classes of milk. This 
change greatly reduce the price received by numerous producers causing great unrest in 
the industry (CDFA, 2007). 
The Second event which encouraged new regulation was a federal court ruling stating 
that no minimum price would be set for the resale of milk purchased by the military 
(CDFA, 2007). The military’s lower price would then be subsidized by producers through 
funds taken from non-military milk transactions. This allowed the military to pay less 
than the minimum price for the lowest valued manufacturing grade milk to producers 
(CDFA, 2007). The discrepancy in price forced other producers to bare the economic 
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burden of the government contracts they serviced (CDFA, 2007). In great part, the added 
stress on the dairy industry which ensued from these two events lead to the development 
of The Gonzales Milk Pooling Act. 
 The Gonzales Milk Pooling Act of 1967 was developed to combat the discrepancy 
between the price producers received for their milk, and it became operational in 1969 
(CDFA, 2007). The Gonzales Milk Pooling Act developed the price pooling system, the 
quota system, and the local differential system (CDFA, 2007). The price pooling system 
made it so a producer was no longer paid based on the class utilization of the plant which 
they serviced (CDFA, 2007). A producer was paid based on the amount of product they 
supplied into the statewide pool.  
 Under the Gonzales Milk Pooling Act all processing facilities in California 
provide the Milk Pooling Branch of the CDFA with a statement that reports the total 
volume of milk utilized, and the amount of that total milk used in the production of 
products in each of the given Classes 1through 4b (CDFA, 2007). The Milk Pooling 
Branch then reports back to the processor the amount that is due to the statewide pool 
based on the processors Class utilization. All processor pay into the pool to establish the 
statewide money pool from which the CDFA pays producers for their contribution to the 
stateside supply. The pay received by each producer is based upon the measurement “per 
hundred pounds” (i.e.: hundred weight or unit) of milk they contributed to the statewide 
pool (CDFA, 2007). This system is such that processors that service higher valued 
Classes pay a larger sum into the statewide pool, thus subsidizing processors servicing 
lower valued Classes in order for all producers to receive the same price for their milk. 
The producer was now paid based on three variables; allocated quota, base, and overbase 
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prices (CDFA, 2007). Allocated quota and base payments where based on an individual 
producers quota holdings and production volume contracts (CDFA, 2007). The payments 
for allocated quota where determined based on the individual producer’s holdings of all 
State issued quota (CDFA, 2007). To determine the base payment an individual 
producer’s received prior to the $1.70 increase per hundred weight of quota holdings, the 
producers contracted quota milk is removed from non-quota production and evaluated as 
a percentage of the statewide pool (CDFA, 2007). If the producer’s production volume is 
greater than the volume covered by their allocated quota and base volume, the excess 
production is assigned the overbase price (CDFA, 2007). The overbase prices reflected 
the poolwide unitization for all the classes, not specifically the plant which the producer 
services (CDFA, 2007). 
 The system of quota was developed in order to appropriately compensate dairy 
farmers who had contracts to service fluid bottling plants prior to The Gonzales Milk 
Pooling Act (CDFA, 2007). Quota was given to processors who had been servicing the 
fluid market prior to the Gonzales Milk Pooling Act in order to provide compensation for 
the loss in product value the new regulation would impose on these producers. To eligible 
producers quota allocation was based on either (i) their production history and Class 1 
utilization during July 1966 through December 1966, or (ii) for the entirety of the 1967 
year (CDFA, 2007). Each producer individually selected which time period was more 
favorable for their own business (CDFA, 2007). Today, quota represents a $1.70 increase 
in value per hundredweight of milk produced (CDFA, 2007). It is easiest to think of 
quota as stocks, not every dairy farmer has purchased stocks, but those who have 
purchased stock receive a financial benefit based on the amount of quota they have 
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invested in. Some producer’s entire production receives the $1.70 quota premium while 
others have only a fraction of their total production receiving quota premium, or even 
have none. 
The Gonzales Milk Pooling Act effectively removed the incentive for a producer to 
service a fluid bottling plant, and encouraged shipping to local plants (CDFA, 2007). 
With the removal of the fluid plant incentive, the formation of location differentials was 
used to incentivize producers to service fluid plants (CDFA, 2007). Prior to 1983 location 
differentials were payments added to or removed from quota payments by processing 
plants in order to aid in offsetting the cost of transporting milk to distant fluid plants 
when local supply was insufficient (CDFA, 2014).  Location differentials have now been 
replaced by the Regional Quota Adjuster (RQA) system (CDFA, 2007). RQA’s are a 
deduction off quota payments received by producers based on each hundredweight of 
quota milk produced (CDFA, 2007).  
 
Federal Milk Marketing Order Evolution 
In many regards the history of the Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMO’s) is 
similar to the California Milk Marketing Order (i.e.: California Order). Until 1934, when 
the Federal Marketing Agreements were ruled illegal in California, the development of 
the dairy industry in California and the Federal system where identical (USDA, 2001). At 
the time California adopted the Young Act in 1935 the two paths of development 
diverged forming two of the systems we have today.  
Jumping back in time to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, we will 
begin to exam the evolution of the FMMO’s. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 
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made it so that participation in the FMMO’s was not mandatory, but voluntary (Jesse, et 
al, 2008). As previously noted, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 
established the same three primary objectives for the FMMO’s as enacted by the Young 
Act in California: 
1. The current and prospective supply and demand relationships for fluid milk 
between producer, processor and consumer. 
2. Assuring a continuous supply of wholesome milk at a reasonable price for 
consumers and producers. 
3. Pricing that regulates a reasonable and sound economic relationship with the price 
of manufacturing grade milk (USDA, 2001). 
These three objectives are accomplished through two federal systems known as 
Classified Pricing and Pooling (Jesse, et al, 2008).  
 Classified Pricing establishes the minimum price paid by processors into the pool 
for milk and milk components based upon which dairy products are being produced 
(Jesse, et al, 2008). The federal system has four classes, which represent specific dairy 
products, to establish minimum pricing: 
1. Class I - representing fluid milk, 
2. Class II - representing cultured and frozen products, 
3. Class III - representing cheese products, 
4. Class IV - representing butter and powdered milk products. 
 The federal Class system is similar to the one used in California today, but has a few key 
differences. An easily identified distinguishing reference marker is found in that the 
federal system uses roman nomenclature to distinguish the dairy class, while the 
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California system uses Arabic nomenclature. Additionally, and more significantly, the 
federal system combines the cultured and frozen dairy classes, while these classes stand 
alone in the California system (Western United Dairymen, 2012).  
 The system of Classified Pricing has undergone many transformation since being 
established in 1937. The system of Parity Pricing (aka Fairy Exchange Value) was the 
predominant pricing system used by the United Stated dairy industry until the middle of 
the Great Depression (Bailey, 1997). The Parity Pricing system functioned under the 
basic premise that the selling price of dairy products should go up and down in direct 
correlation with the costs of all inputs utilized to produce the product (Bailey, 1997). The 
system was phased out between 1919 and 1933 when the dairy industry saw a 67% price 
decline for dairy products with no change in the cost of production. Today if the Parity 
Pricing system was active, the price of raw milk in November 2012 would have been 
$52.10/cwt or $4.50/gallon (Bailey, 1997).  This pricing system would be unrealistic in 
today’s dairy industry, but the concept behind Parity Pricing is still alive today in the 
form of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) which is discussed further herein 
under the sections addressing dysfunctions of the current regulations (Bailey, 2002). 
 After the expiration of the Parity Pricing system, the dairy industry began to use 
two payment systems. The first was based simply on the volume of milk produced 
(Bailey, 1997). This method was unfavorable due to its potential encouragement of 
producer tampering with milk through the addition of water. Such tampering in fact 
become common practice by some in the industry (Bailey, 1997). Due to the frequent 
tempering of milk, the industry began to use volume and milk fat percentage to determine 
the value of each hundredweight of milk (Bailey, 1997). This method was made possible 
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by the Babcock Test (Bailey, 1997). The Babcock Test, which measures the level of fat in 
the milk, was developed in 1890, but not widely used until after the Great Depression 
(Bailey, 1997). The Minnesota-Wisconsin Pricing system (M-W) revolutionized the way 
in which milk was paid for in the early 1960’s (Bailey, 2002). By averaging the price 
paid for manufacturing milk by various processing plants located though out Minnesota 
and Wisconsin, the M-W Price was established.  M-W Price was reported by the National 
Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) monthly, and was then used to establish a base 
milk price throughout the FMMO’s. The M-W Pricing system allowed the milk price for 
each class to be determined on a month-to-month bases, and it took into account many 
adjustment factors to adjust the competitive pay price (Bailey, 1997).  The M-W Pricing 
system underwent minor changes prior to being replaced in 2000 by the End Product 
Pricing system used today (Bailey, 1997).  
The End Product Pricing System was designed to make a more level playing field 
for all producers by paying each producer based on their share of the final product 
produced in any given month (Bailey, 1997). This system has processors pay into a 
market wide pool based on the class of products they are producing in order to determine 
the milk price received by all producers.  The pricing formulas are highly complex taking 
into consideration multiple factors. Some of the components used to calculate the End 
Product Price formulas include; milk fat and protein standards, processor make allowance 
(a safety net established by the CDFA equal to a portion of the cost of processing all 
dairy products), prices obtained from the Chicago Merchant Exchange (CME) for the 
wholesale of butter and cheese, and the weighted average price for California Non Fat 
Dry Milk Powder (NFDMP). Due to the complexity of the formulas the pricing system is 
 22 
difficult to work with, and it is not widely understood. In an informal survey I conducted 
of dairy producers in the central valley, one out of thirteen native English speaking 
producers was able to explain any portion of the formulas used to determine producer 
milk price. This lack of understanding is only exacerbated by the periodic changes to the 
formulas to account for new industry factors. 
 The overall federal system of Pooling had been designed with the goal to 
eliminate destructive competition between farmers. This is accomplished by making the 
value of raw milk the same for all producers regardless of the end utilization of the 
producer’s milk. The pooling price is used to determine the price a producer receives for 
raw milk. The value is determined by adding the value of all milk used in every Class, 
and then dividing it by the total milk deliveries, resulting in the Blend Price. This Blend 
Price is the weighted average price paid to dairymen regardless of how their milk was 
utilized. 
Since the system was first implemented in 1937, the number of FMMO’s has 
greatly reduced over the last 77 year. Initially the FMMO consisted of 31 orders, however 
today there are only 10 orders remaining (Western United Dairymen, 2012). The 
reduction to less than a third of the original FMMO’s is due more to the consolidation of 
FMMO territories rather than regions choosing to secede from the Federal program. With 
today’s technological advancements, milk is able to travel great distances without 
concerns of contamination or perishing which made the reduction to 10 FMMO’s 
possible (Western United Dairymen, 2012). 
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Idaho Dairy Industry 
Upon Idaho’s seceding from the Western Federal Milk Marketing Order in April 
2004, the Idaho dairy industry became deregulated. The termination of the Western 
FMMO in 2004 has made it difficult for individuals to access information regarding 
Idaho’s dairy industry. Due to the limited publication of information the dairy industry in 
Idaho will not be covered in great detail. 
 The milk classification system adopted in Idaho after seceding from the Western 
FMMO is similar in structure to that seen in California and also in the FMMO’s. Idaho’s 
system has four classes identical to the FMMO classes, which represent specific dairy 
products produced under each Class (DeKruyf, 2012b): 
1. Class I - representing fluid milk. 
2. Class II - representing cultured and frozen products. 
3. Class III - representing hard cheese products. 
4. Class IV - representing butter and powdered milk products. 
These classes are used to differentiate product value, as well as, to track production 
within the state.  
According to the dairy statistics published by Progressive Dairymen in 2012 
Idaho’s dairy industry is thriving in deregulation. As of 2012 Idaho has a total of 565 
dairies, 580,000 cows, and produces 6,163,413 metric tonnes (13,588 million pounds) of 
milk annually. According to Glanbia Foods, Idaho is producing more milk per capita, and 
it is the third largest milk producer in the United States, the Idaho dairy industry is 
continuing to grow. Currently of Idaho’s milk supply 69% becomes cheese, 25% 
becomes powder, and 6% becomes fluid or cultured and frozen products (DeKruyf, 
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2012b). The growth in the Idaho dairy industry is made apparent by the recent expansion 
in dairy processing facilities in the state. Chobani foods opened a new Greek Yogurt 
facility in Twin Falls, Idaho in 2012 representing a $450 million dollar investment 
(Chobani, Inc., 2014). 
Canadian Dairy Industry 
 Today, Canada has 1.4 million cows and 12,529 dairies (CDC, 2012-2013). The 
national average is 77 cows per farm, with each cow producing 9.780 kg of milk annually 
(CDC, 2012-2013). Canada consists of 10 provinces, and in the 2012-2013 dairy year, the 
Eastern provinces of Quebec and Ontario (two of the Eastern provinces) had 82% of 
dairy farms, followed by the Western provinces at 13%, and the Atlantic provinces (i.e.: 
remaining Eastern provinces) at 5% (CDC, 2012-2013).  Of the raw milk produced, 40% 
goes into processed fluid milk, and 60% goes into industrial (aka manufacturing) milk 
(USDA, 2013). Of the milk designated for industry purposes 60% goes into the 
production of butter, cheese, yogurt, and ice cream (USDA, 2013). Approximately, 75% 
of all dairy processing is done by Saputo, Agropur, and Parmalat (USDA, 2013). 
Similar to the situation across the United States, Canada has seen a large reduction in 
the number of dairy farms over the last decade. The Canadian Dairy Commission 
reported in the early 1970’s having 130,000 dairy farms, in 1999 this number was 
109,640, and today there are 12,529 dairies (CDC, 2012-2013 & USDA, 2013). Since 
1999, the number of farms has decreased by 36% while the number of cows has increased 
by 30% (USDA, 2013). The 2012 cost of production per hectoliter of milk (227.3 pounds 
of milk or just over two hundredweights) was $77.79, and the price is projected to have 
increased in 2013 (USDA, 2013).  
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The Canadian dairy industry is primarily governed by the Canadian Dairy 
Commission (CDC). The CDC uses a classified system similar to those found under the 
various United States dairy governances. The Canadian system of classification has 
similar groupings, but a larger array of subcategories than found in the United States 
systems; 
1. Class 1 (a-d) - representing fluid milk, 
2. Class 2 (a-b) - representing cultured and frozen products, 
3. Class 3 (a-d) - representing all cheese products, 
4. Class 4 (a,a1,b,c,d,m) - representing butter, concentrate, powdered milk, and more 
products,  
5. Class 5 (a-d) - representing all dairy ingredients products (CDC, 1994). 
The pricing formula for each of the various Classes of milk is determined based on 
butterfat content, protein content, and other solid components in raw milk (CD, 1994). 
Canada is broken into ten provinces, each of which has a provincial milk 
marketing board (USDA, 2013). These provincial milk marketing boards each set fluid 
milk production limits, product pricing formulas, quota policies, and other specialized 
regulation for their region (USDA, 2013). Although the individual provinces set their 
fluid milk production limits, the CDC set a national industrial milk production limit. The 
CDC utilizes a supply management system based on Canadian milk market demands to 
determine the national industrial milk demand. The CDC then allocates industrial milk 
production to the various provinces through the Market Sharing Quota formula (USDA, 
2013).  
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The Market Sharing Quota formula allows for industrial milk allocation to be 
done based on various dairy products needs for butterfat (USDA, 2013). Quota is 
allocated on a butterfat basis to the various provinces from the Canadian Milk Supply 
Management Committee (CMSMC) (USDA, 2013). The CMSMC determines each 
province’s Market Share Quota from the terms set in the National Milk Marketing Plan 
(USDA, 2013). Once quota is allocated to the individual provinces, each province then 
allocates quota to producers based on their individual pooling agreements (USDA, 2013). 
Quota is observed on a monthly basis and is adjusted every two months in order to meet 
Canadian milk market demands (CDC, 2011-2012). 
The system of quota pooling at the CDC level is designed to pool the market and 
producer returns in order to diminish financial risk as the domestic dairy market 
fluctuates (CDC, 2012-2013). The system consists of three agreements in order to reduce 
market risk (CDC, 2012-2013). The three agreements are the comprehensive agreement 
on pooling of milk revenues, the agreement on the Eastern Canadian Milk pooling, and 
the Western Milk Pooling Agreement (CDC, 2012-2013). 
The Canadian Comprehensive Agreement on pooling of milk revenues was 
developed under the 1995 Special Milk Class Permit Program (CDC, 2012-2013). This 
program provides the means for the market revenue returns from the sale of milk for 
special class purposes to processors to be shared among the dairy producers of all ten 
provinces (CDC, 2012-2013). The agreement on the Eastern Canadian Milk pooling is an 
agreement for producers in Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince 
Edward Island to ensure that all revenues from all milk sales are pooled and evenly 
distrusted to farms based on their milk contribution (CDC, 2012-2013). The Western 
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Milk Pooling Agreement is an agreement in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British 
Columbia allows for the sharing of all markets and returns from dairy sales in the 
Western region (CDC, 2012-2013). 
When the CDC sets limits for industrial milk, it is set based on Canadian demand 
without consideration of projected international demands (USDA, 2013). The CDC 
setting milk production limits based on internal Canadian milk market demands allows 
for little to no fluctuation in the production limits from year to year and no room for the 
Canadian dairy industry in response to global demands (USDA, 2013). The CDC’s 
domestically introspective way of producing milk production limits is in part due a 2002 
ruling of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (USDA, 2013). The WTO capped 
subsidized exports of dairy products from Canada leading to a limited quantity of dairy 
products which can be exported from Canada (USDA, 2013). In 2012, the main dairy 
products exported from Canada were cheese, ice cream, whey, and skim milk powder 
(USDA, 2013).  
Under this regulatory system the Canadian dairy industry announced on October 
18, 2013 a new agreement with the European Union regarding export cheese (USDA, 
2013). Through this agreement the European Union is granting dairy concession that 
more than doubles the current Canadian access level (USDA, 2013).  
 
European Union Dairy Industry 
The European Union (EU) is a representative body that consists of 28 Member 
States today. These 28 Member States produce various commodities to support the entire 
European Union. Of the agricultural commodities produced in the European Union, milk 
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accounts for 15% of the European Union’s total agricultural production, and milk ranks 
as the third largest rural industry (European Commission, 2014). The European Union's 
main dairy producing Member States are Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Italy and Poland; together they account for more than 70% of the EU total 
milk production (European Commission, 2014). Total EU milk production in 2013 was 
just over 138.5 million metric tonnes (152.3 million tons) and represented, an increase 
from 134.2 million metric tonnes (147.62 million tons) in 2009 (European Dairy 
Association, 2013). As with each of the dairy systems examined in this paper, there has 
been a reduction in the number of dairy cows in the EU in recent years. In 2009 there was 
23.566 million dairy cows in the entire European Union, and as of 2013 there were 
22.600 million dairy cows (European Dairy Association, 2013). In 2011 on average each 
of these cows produced 6500 kg of milk annually (European Commission, 2014). 
 As dairying within the EU covers a vast variety of geographical areas, it is hard to 
say that any one style of dairying is most commonly utilized. Throughout the EU there 
are numerous examples of free stall farms and pasture based farms; some with thousands 
of cows and other with just a few hundred cows. The variety both in geography and in 
management practices utilized presents the EU with a unique challenge when regulating 
the dairy industry. The main governing body of the EU dairy industry is the Common 
Market Organization’s Dairy Division (CMO) (European Commission, 2011).   
 Under the CMO, the regulation of the dairy industry throughout the EU has 
undergone drastic change in recent years (European Commission, 2011). The main body 
of legislation which regulates not only the dairy industry, but all agriculture is the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) program (European Commission, 2011). The CAP 
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program began in 1962 as a system which would purchase farmers goods when market 
prices fell below a set level (European Commission, 2011). The goal of the CAP was to 
create and maintain stable market conditions for the EU agricultural producers and 
processors (European Commission, 2012c).  
 Throughout the EU the processing and selling of fluid milk is commonly done 
directly by the producer on farm or by farmer-owned cooperatives for direct sale to the 
consumer (European Commission, 2014). There are some Member States where the 
majority of raw processing is done not by the producer or cooperative, but by private 
companies (European Commission, 2014). In the processing of manufactured dairy 
products, a majority of processing is done through cooperative owned facilities or by 
private companies. The EU producer’s milk price is based upon a complex set of factors 
including: supply and demand on the internal EU market, world dairy product prices, 
currency exchange rate fluctuation, quality requirements and demands of specific 
products, the competition situation in the food chain, and finally the support for the dairy 
market and the farmers from the CAP (European Commission, 2006). The EU System 
that includes many of the markets variables in the pricing system which determines the 
producer’s milk price is designed to allow greater opportunity for market signaling and 
transparency in demand. Although the pricing system aims for transparency, the system is 
still promoting mixed messages. 
This CAP program has undergone various changes since 1962 which have 
increased the program’s involvement in the agriculture sectors of the EU (European 
Commission, 2011). By 1970, the CAP program was so heavily subsidizing the 
agriculture industry that it accounted for around 87% of the European Union’s budget 
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(European Commission, 2011). As the program was quickly spiraling into an 
unsustainable future, major reform to the program ensued. Since its implementation in 
1962, the CAP program has undergone many reformations with the two most recent 
occurring in 2003 and 2013 (European Commission, 2011).   
The reform in 2003 focused on farmer payments from CAP subsidy programs. 
Previously, payments from the CAP where not paid directly to the farmer, but as of 2003 
a majority of the subsidies paid by CAP go directly to individual farmers (European 
Commission, 2011). This reform is still in place today, representing an enormous portion 
of the CAP’s budget. In 2013, 57.5 billion euros out of the total EU budget of 132.8 
billion euros was used in the form of direct farm subsidies and rural development projects 
(European Commission, 2011).  
 The most recent CAP ‘health check’ reform of 2008 was implemented in 2010, 
and it is a multiphase reform that is to be completed in mid-2020 (European Commission, 
2011). Specific to the dairy industry, the 2008 CAP reform focuses on the milk quota 
system developed in 1984 (European Commission, 2011). The quota system set in place 
by the EU CAP system was implemented to control the issue of over production which 
was plaguing the dairy industry (European Commission, 2006). Under this quota system 
each Member State is provided with a portion of the total EU raw product volume needed 
to satisfy the demands of all Member States (European Commission, 2006). The allocated 
quota correlates with the size of the dairy industry in the given Member State. Once the 
Member State receives their quota volume allocation, it is contracted to the Member 
State’s producers in accordance with the individual state’s regulation (European 
Commission, 2006). If producers of a Member State produced more than their quota 
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allotment, under this system the Member State is penalized for overproduction based on 
volume, and they are fined (European Commission, 2006). This penalty for over 
production is then passed down to the cooperative and their individually contracted 
producers (European Commission, 2006).   
 This quota system has been widely unsuccessful in controlling the overproduction 
issue within the EU dairy industry. This is in part due to the lack of consistent contracting 
between producers and their cooperative or private processors. Presently, with no 
succinct mandatory contracting system at the Member State to producer level, the lack of 
market consistency is creating a volume management issue. The volume which a 
producer is going to be producing in any given season changes based on many factors, 
such as, feed quality and weather. As many of these factors are being insufficiently 
planned for, the resulting over or under production creates great havoc for the EU dairy 
industry as a whole (U.K. Parliament, 2014). Many of the contracting systems currently 
active between producers and processors of various Member States merely create the 
obligation of the producer to deliver all raw product produced (i.e. no a set volume to the 
contracted processor) (U.K. Parliament, 2014). Similarly, the contract outlines the 
obligation of the processor to take all the raw product produced by contracted producers 
even if it is more than is necessary for production demand (U.K. Parliament, 2014). In a 
system where both sides have no signal or system for controlling the production volumes, 
the quota system has been ineffective (U.K. Parliament, 2014). 
 As the quota system has been unsuccessful in controlling the issue of over 
production of milk in the European Union, the 2008 CAP reform adopted a new system 
to control production. Under the 2008 CAP reform, the system of quota is being 
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completely eliminated by start of 2015. The removal of the current quota system is being 
done through a series of quota increases over six years (European Commission, 2012d). 
This six year phase out of quota is designed to slowly remove the dependency within the 
dairy industry on quota by increasing quota yearly. Starting April 1, 2008, milk quota 
throughout the EU was increased by 2% representing the start of the six year plan 
(European Commission, 2012d). For each subsequent year until quotas expiration in 
2015, there will be a 1% increase in milk quota totaling 5% guaranteed increase in quota 
volume (European Commission, 2012d). The guaranteed 5% increase will be coupled 
with an additional adjustment for the fat correction factor (European Commission, 
2012d). The adjustment for the fat correction of milk is used to establish an average fat 
level in all milk from all cattle breeds, and in 2009 actually effectively represented an 
additional 1% increase in the quota increase (European Commission, 2012d). As the 
quota level has been annually increasing for several years, the producers of many 
Member States have been falling short of quota, thus making the impact of the quota 
program far less than was historically experienced (European Commission, 2012d). 
As quota is being phased out, the EU has approved the Milk Package. The Milk 
Package is a temporary optional piece of regulation that applies to the dairy industry until 
mid-2020 (U.K. Parliament, 2014). The milk package is designed to target the issues 
identified by the 2010 Dairy Commission study. These issues include: lack of price 
transparency along the food chain; the valued added processing of some products (such 
as whey) are not making their way back to producers; the minimal planning regarding 
raw milk supply volume; the current contracting obligation language for both producers 
and processors; and the underutilization of formalized written contracts between 
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producers, processors, and retailers (U.K. Parliament, 2014).  This Milk Package includes 
a series of measure that aim to enhance the transparency in the market, to allow for 
producer and processor response to the market demands, and to share the financial 
realities of the dairy market (European Commission, 2012b). One of these measures 
outlines written contracts between producers and processors, for a specified period of 
time, which clearly outlines a set price or price formula, a set volume, and the collection 
schedule (European Commission, 2012b). These contracts allow producers and 
processors to negotiate terms as long as the contract does not account for more than 3.5% 
of the European Union’s production or 33% of the national production volume (U.K. 
Parliament, 2014). Productions that represent more than 3.5% of the European Union’s 
production or more than 33% of the national production volume are governed specifically 
by the CMO. Although all contracts and measures implemented under the Milk Package 
will be eliminated upon the completion of the CAP reform in 2020, the EU is 
encouraging the entire EU dairy industry to adopt these models (European Commission, 
2012b).  
 Since the 2008 CAP reform programs implementation in 2010, the EU has seen 
significant changes in the dairy industry. The largest change reported has been in regards 
to the supply and demand relationship of milk (European Commission, 2011). The supply 
of milk is now moving in accordance with the true representative value of milk on the 
market, and not being as driven by the value of quota in the majority of the Member 
States (European Commission, 2011). In the 2012-2013 dairy year, only five of the 
Member States produced more than their quota limits (European Commission, 2012c). 
Austria, Germany, Denmark, Poland, and Cyprus each exceeded their quota limits and 
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are paying approximately 46 million euros in fines. Although five Member States 
exceeded their quota limit, the total EU production remained 6% below total allocated 
quota (European Commission, 2012c). The reduction in surplus throughout the EU 
correlates directly with the reduction in subsidies, and reveals that the majority of 
Member States are responding to the market demands and are producing accordingly. 
 Along with the reform to the quota system, the ‘health check’ CAP reform aims: 
to ensure European money is being spent on the European public goods and not moving 
across the boarders; to focus on environmental programs; to significantly reduce the 
CAP’s budget expenditures; and to develop stronger national oversight of Member State 
farm policies (Valentin Zahrant, 2010). The success of the CAP reform at controlling 
milk supply and creating market stability through transparency is apparent in the 
continuous increase in milk prices since 2010. The 2013 annual average for the EU milk 
price was 37.81 euro/ 100kg (36). After experiencing continuous growth in international 
trade since 2008, the EU experienced the first decline in exports in the first quarter of 
2013 (European Dairy Association, 2013). Exports declined by 2.5 billion pounds as a 
result of growing domestic market demands throughout the EU (McKinsey & Company, 
2007).  
 
Australian Dairy Industry 
 The dairy industry in Australia is largely pasture based unlike the dairy industry 
in the United States. Today, the Australian national herd consists of 1.65 million cows, 
with an average herd size of 258 cows each producing 5.525 liters annually (Dairy 
Australia, 2012-2013b). As seen in all major dairy industries, Australia has experienced a 
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reduction in the number of operational dairies along with a reduction in the number of 
cows nationally (Dobson, et al, 2000). In 1975 Australia had 30,000 dairy farms, in 2000 
there were 14,000 dairy farms, and today there are 6,398 registered dairy farms (Dairy 
Australia, 2012-2013b). Dairy production is the third largest rural industry in Australia 
representing $13 billion (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013b). The Australia dairy industry 
controls 7% of the international dairy trade with the dairy industry exports representing 
40% of the total milk production, and valued at $2.76 billion in 2012-2013 (Dairy 
Australia, 2012-2013b).  
 Dairy production in Australia is seen in each of their seven states in order to 
supply fresh fluid milk domestically, but a majority of the Australian dairy industry is 
located in the south-east states (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013b). Australian milk utilization 
is greatly influenced by the international demands for dairy products. Today, 88% of milk 
is processed into three products; two of which are highly demanded internationally. Of all 
processed milk: 33% is processed into cheese; 28% into skim milk powder (SMP) and 
butter; and 27% into fluid milk products for domestic sale (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013b).  
The main importers of Australian dairy products include China at 129,000 metric tonnes, 
Japan at 125,000 metric tonnes, and Singapore at 84,000 metric tonnes (Dairy Australia, 
2012-2013a)). It is important to note that both Malaysia and Indonesia also import a 
significant volume of Australian Dairy products, but at lower volumes than China, Japan, 
or Singapore (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013a)). 
 Today, the Australian dairy industry is governed by the Australian Government’s 
Department of Agriculture under the Australian Dairy Industry Council (ADIC). The 
current regulatory system in Australia is commonly known as “Deregulated Australia”. 
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This Deregulated system was adopted July 1, 2000 upon the disbanding of the Domestic 
Market Support Scheme (DMS) enacted in 1995 (Dobson, et al, 2000). The deregulated 
system divides dairy processing into two systems, fluid milk and manufacturing milk. 
This division serves a similar purpose to the Class System in the California Order, and 
ensures that consumers have an adequate supply of fluid milk year round.  
 Prior to the deregulation of 2000, the supply of milk and the pricing of all dairy 
was regulated by both the Australian Government and the State (Dairy Australia, 2012-
2013a). The Government regulations focused on foreign affairs and trade, taxation, and 
food safety, while the State regulations controlled sourcing, distribution and milk pricing 
(Dairy Australia, 2012-2013a). The objective of this multi-tiered, highly regulated system 
was to ensure year round supply of fresh drinking milk in a seasonal pasture based dairy 
industry, as well as, a higher producer price (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013a).  In the early 
1990’s prior to the DMS program or Deregulation, the Australian Government conducted 
an independent survey of the competition policy within the Dairy Industry (AGDA, 
2011). This survey hinged on the idea that government regulation should not restrict 
competition in a market unless the regulation was the only effective way to protect public 
interest (AGDA, 2011). The study revealed that the highly regulated dairy industry 
(specifically in the Victorian State, the largest dairy producing state) had a negative effect 
on public investment (AGDA, 2011). As the Victorian State choose to deregulate for 
public interest, the other states followed in order to remain competitive with producers in 
the Victorian State (AGDA, 2011). 
 During the transition into the deregulated system the Dairy Adjustment Program 
offered four relief options to dairy producers designed to aid in the orderly deregulation 
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of the dairy industry (Dobson, et al, 2000). The four programs to provide the transition 
relief were names, the Dairy Structural Adjustment Program, the Supplementary Dairy 
Assistance Program, the Dairy Exit Payments Program, and the Regional Assistance 
Program. Each program provided producers with differing avenues for deregulation and 
are discussed below (Dobson, et al, 2000).  
The Dairy Structural Adjustment Program and the Supplementary Dairy 
Assistance Program were designed to provide all producers in the Australasian system as 
of September 28, 1999, with financial assistance for continued operation (Dobson, et al, 
2000). These program provided approximately $1.6 billion to the dairy industry over 8 
years on 32 quarterly based payments (Dobson, et al, 2000). The level of assistance 
provided to each producer was determined by individual milk production and sales during 
the dairy year of 1998 -1999 (Dobson, et al, 2000). The support payments represented 
nearly $20,000 each month to producers throughout Australia (Dobson, et al, 2000). 
These payments where funded through an 11 cent per liter sales tax levy placed on 
consumers of dairy products (Dobson, et al, 2000). This levy did not apply to export dairy 
products, and was in effect domestically from July 8, 2000, to February 22, 2009 
(Dobson, et al, 2000). 
Those producers who choose to exit the industry, but had been an active producer 
in the dairy year of 1998-1999 where eligible for the third relief program. Under the 
Dairy Structural Adjustment Program, the Dairy Exit Payment Program offered financial 
incentive to producers exiting the production industry (Dobson, et al, 2000). The Dairy 
Exit Payment Program provided up to $45,000 tax free aid to dairy farmers exiting the 
industry (Dobson, et al, 2000). The amount each producer received was determined on an 
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individual basis upon criteria developed by the Australian Assistance Program. Of the 
entire Australian dairy industry, only 7% of producers chose to utilize the Dairy Exit 
Payment Program and leave the dairy business (Dobson, et al, 2000).   
The fourth piece of the Australian Assistance Program was the Regional 
Assistance Program. This program did not focus on the producers themselves, but rather 
on the communities in which dairy production represented a significant economic facet 
(Dobson, et al, 2000). The program provided funds for diversification to communities 
previously reliant upon the dairy industry, and which had been impacted by the reduction 
in the Australian dairy industry (Dobson, et al, 2000). 
The Dairy Adjustment Authority (DAA) established in 2000 under the Dairy 
Produce Act of 1986 was designed to regulate the Adjustment Programs, and to ensure a 
smooth deregulation (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013b). The DAA worked with all sides of 
the dairy industry to review the systems designed to aid in the transition to deregulation, 
as well as, to rework aspects of regulation which proved ineffective. The DAA also 
oversaw the implementation of two levy systems that were removed in 2009 (AGDA, 
2011). The first levy was implemented by retailers and paid by consumers focusing on 
fluid milk consumed domestically, and was paid directly to producers (Dobson, et al, 
2000). The second levy was placed on manufactured dairy products for domestic sale 
(Dobson, et al, 2000). This levy also was paid to processors, but was expected to be pass 
onto domestic dairy consumers in the form of a reduced price for domestic goods 
(Dobson, et al, 2000). This levy was designed to reduce the disadvantage that domestic 
processors faced due to low cost imported goods (Dobson, et al, 2000).  Today there is 
only one active levy in Australia (AGDA, 2011). The Dairy Product Levy is placed on 
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milk sent to a manufacturer and provides funds for marketing, animal health programs, 
and research and development projects (AGDA, 2011).  
Under the deregulated system, the price paid to producer is set entirely by market 
forces. There is no minimum price set and no legislative controls placed on the price 
which a processor must pay a producer (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013b). The price 
producers receive for milk is based on the milk fat and protein content of the milk they 
produce as defined by individual contracting (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013b). All 
producers and processors prices are established by the market demands, and both sectors 
of the industry share the burden of market fluctuations.   
  Having moved towards deregulation 14 years ago, Australia has served as a live 
model for other dairy systems, such as California, to examine the results of choosing a 
path of deregulation.  Results of deregulation in 2000 have been significant across all 
facets of the dairy industry. As the Australia dairy industry began its deregulation in 2000 
when the dairy market internationally was extremely strong, it is commonly assumed that 
overall deregulation was made easier by the strong global market (Dobson, et al, 2000). 
With incentives to those servicing the fluid milk supply combined with programs 
providing financial aid during the transition, the overall results of moving to the 
deregulated system have been a decreased supply surplus and increase in prices in the 
Australian dairy industry (McKinsey & Company, 2007). 
When comparing the production side of the industry pre and post deregulation, it 
can be deduced that fewer producers are now milking larger and more efficient herd. The 
price that the producer is receiving today is 33% less than the averages prices seen under 
the highly subsidized programs prior to 2000 (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013a)). The 
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national average price a producer received for raw milk in 2013 was $5.7 per kilogram of 
milk solids (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013b). This price was the lowest received since the 
2008-2009 dairy year when producers averaged $4.98/kg of milk solids, and far below 
the high of 2007 -2008 of $6.68/kg of milk solids (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013b). A farm 
survey conducted by Abares revealed that, although the price received was down 33% 
from dairy years 2011-2012 to 2012-2013, the milk price fell only 2% below the average 
of the preceding 10 dairy years. The survey of the past 10 years of producer price reveals 
the true stability in the market price under a deregulated system. The stability of milk 
price was a topic of great concern prior to deregulation, and this survey result proves that 
while minor fluctuations occur, the price remains less volatile than had been feared. As 
lower profits have been the reality of the deregulated system since the international 
market crisis of 2009, there has been a reduction in the number of producers looking to 
invest in facility improvements (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013a).  
The processing sector of the dairy industry has also been significant change since 
deregulation. Today there are many more small processing plants which concentrate in 
specialty products than had been historically operating (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013a). 
The number of small on farm fluid processing facilities has greatly increased especially 
on farms outside of the south-eastern region (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013a). Throughout 
the processing sector there has been substantial increase in the diversity of products being 
produced. This diversification has encouraged multi-purpose plants, and has increased 
innovation. The processing sector now reacts in accordance with the market and 
international demands more effectively. This is illustrated by the rapidly increased in the 
number of plants producing lactoferrin in order to meet the increasing demands of the 
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Asian market (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013a). It has also become common practice 
throughout the industry for processors to develop initiatives to support the productivity of 
their producers (Dairy Australia, 2012-2013a). 
 
New Zealand Dairy Industry 
New Zealand is a country in the Oceana region consisting of two islands. 
Although a significant international dairy player, New Zealand releases very limited 
information regarding the dairy industry. As their public publication are limited, the 
review of the New Zealand dairy industry is limited. Specific information on product 
production and exports are not included in detail as the information is not publicly 
available. It is known that the dairy sector directly accounts for $5 million or 2.8% if the 
New Zealand national GDP (Fonterra, 2010). New Zealand dairy production accounts for 
approximately 2% of the global production of milk (in comparison to the United States at 
12%). Yet, New Zealand dairy products account for approximately a third of all 
international dairy products. Of the total New Zealand dairy production, 95% is made for 
export (Evens, 2004). New Zealand products are exported to 151 countries with major 
market shares in China, the United States, Japan, and the European Union (Ministry For 
Primary Industries, 2013). Although these countries represent key markets for New 
Zealand dairy exports, the destination for 72% of dairy products exported was to various 
developing countries (Ministry For Primary Industries, 2013). 
The New Zealand dairy industry is a seasonal pasture based system similar to that 
seen in Australia. The dairy industry’s production is tied very closely to the severity of 
the rainy season. In years of drought the volume of production, as well as, the protein and 
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fat components of the milk produced decreases significantly altering the processing 
sectors production capabilities. Today the New Zealand dairy industry consists of 11,891 
farms milking 4.78 million cows (DairyNZ, 2013). The annually average production for 
each cow in 2012-2013 was 3,947 liters which represented a decrease of 4.9% from 
2011-2012 (DairyNZ, 2013). It is important to note that production level of New Zealand 
cows is highly volatile due to the pasture management and feed issues, and in 2012-2013 
New Zealand experienced a drought. As New Zealand is on a pasture based system, the 
industry is also very seasonal in its production ability as is apparent by the breakdown of 
production averages. In October, at the height of dairy production, the average cow 
produced 22.96 liters daily versus in April, the lowest point of dairy production when the 
average was 11.77 liters daily (DairyNZ, 2013). 
The number of farms in New Zealand was declining at an average of 170 herds 
per year from 1980 to 2008 (DairyNZ, 2013). This reduction correlated with an increase 
in the size of individual producers which has tripled over the last 30 years (DairyNZ, 
2013). These trends are similarly to the other dairy industries reviewed in this paper; that 
is true until this year. In 2012-2013 an additional 93 dairy farms opened in New Zealand 
(DairyNZ, 2013). In 2012-2013 the number of dairy cows in New Zealand increased by 
150,000 in large part due to the increased number of farms. The size of herds throughout 
New Zealand varies greatly based on region. With 75% of farms located in the North 
Islands, and 62% of cows located in the South Island, it is difficult to use a country 
average to accurately depict farm size (DairyNZ, 2013). Just over 50% of New Zealand 
herds are between 150-300 cows, while 26% of herds are 500 cows or more (DairyNZ, 
2013). A decade ago only 32% of all dairies had 300 cows or more (DairyNZ, 2013). 
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 During 2012-2013, even in a year of drought, New Zealand saw the highest 
volume of production in history. In the 2012-2013 dairy year, New Zealand processed 
18,883 million liters of milk in various dairy products (DairyNZ, 2013). Production of 
2009-2010, a non-drought year, was 16,483 million liters, and in dairy year 1989-1999 
when production was 10,563 million liters. From the volume of production it is clear 
New Zealand dairy production is greatly expanding (DairyNZ, 2013).  
The governing of the New Zealand dairy industry has been dominated by 
cooperative since 1871 (Dairy Companies Associates of New Zealand, 2014). The 
number of active cooperative within New Zealand has been steadily declining over the 
years due to improved technologies and increased cost efficiency (Dairy Companies 
Associates of New Zealand, 2014). Today Fonterra, Tatua, and Westland are the three 
main cooperative that control the dairy industry in New Zealand (Ministry For Primary 
Industries, 2013). Fonterra which represents the largest receiver and processor of milk, 
will be the focus for the remained of this review of New Zealand. 
Until the end of the 2000-2001 dairy year, the Total Payout Program provided 
producers with advanced and final payment for the products they produced (DairyNZ, 
2013). This program was developed and regulated by the New Zealand Dairy Board to 
ensure that producers were paid their portion of the Dairy Boards subsidy, as well as, for 
dairy processing efficiency, increased product mix, and investment policies (DairyNZ, 
2013). In 2001, the Dairy Industry Restructuring Act (DIRA) paved the way for New 
Zealand’s largest dairy cooperatives to form mergers (DairyNZ, 2013). As a result, Kiwi 
Cooperative Dairy Company, New Zealand Dairy Group, and many smaller cooperatives 
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merged to form the Golden Dairy Company now known as the Fonterra Dairy Board 
(DairyNZ, 2013).  
The 2001 DIRA was not formed to be an active regulator of the cooperatives, but 
aimed to ensure two key items for the New Zealand dairy industry were controlled. One 
item was that all cooperatives function under the policy of open entry for any prospective 
producer, as well as, a cost neutral and timely option for exiting (Evens, 2004). This open 
policy was to be regulated by the Commerce Commission, and aimed to protect 
producers from becoming forced suppliers of any given cooperative (Evens, 2004). The 
second key aspect of the DIRA was a requirement set on Fonterra to supply up to 400 
million liters of raw milk to other cooperative and independent processors on competitive 
terms (Evens, 2004). 
Fonterra has been a wildly successful company which today controls 96% of the New 
Zealand milk supply (Ministry For Primary Industries, 2013). Owning and operating 25 
plants in New Zealand and another 30 plants around the globe, Fonterra is a significant 
global player in the international dairy market (Evens, 2004). As a whole Fonterra 
produced 2.4 million metric tonnes of dairy ingredients last year, of which 2.1 million 
metric tonnes was produced in New Zealand (Fonterra, 2014). Fonterra with revenues of 
$15.7 billion ranked fourth in the Rabobank 2012 Global Dairy Top 20 report following 
Nestles at $25.9 billion, Danone at $19.5 billion, and the Unites States at $18.8 billion 
(Fonterra, 2014). In order to manage prices and inventory in response to global demands, 
Fonterra has invested heavily in the development of processing facilities, technologies 
and product innovation (McKinsey & Company, 2007). As a result Fonterra has seen a 
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40% increase in their cooperative owner share value, and until recent years a continuous 
increase in the milk price received by producers (McKinsey & Company, 2007). 
New Zealand producers receive no subsidies. They are paid based on a formula which 
considers milk fat and protein levels with adjustments based on the volume of production 
(DairyNZ, 2013). This method of payment with no subsidies has led to the increasing 
focus of low-cost, high productivity farming systems (DairyNZ, 2013). The payment 
system is not government controlled or dictated which allows Fonterra, based on sheer 
size, to set the national price for producer’s milk. Fonterra uses the fair-value share 
pricing to establish the payment received by their producers (Fonterra, 2014). It is 
important to note that the fair-value share pricing is contracted out and calculated by an 
independent company this is overseen by the Fonterra Shareholders Council (Fonterra, 
2014). The price received by producers has been declining over the past two years from 
$8.02/kg in 2010-2011 to $6.18/kg today (DairyNZ, 2013). This decline coupled with the 
increasing strength of the international dairy market has led to the New Zealand dairy 
industry questioning the way in which Fonterra is setting the milk price. As a result of 
uncertainty, the 2001 DIRA was amended in 2012 to address the rumors of misconduct 
(Evens, 2004).  
The 2012 reform aimed to increase transparency in the market, improve confidence in 
Fonterra’s producer payments, and ensure value added profits were shared with producers 
(Evens, 2004). The amendment to the DIRA gave power to the Commerce Commission 
to: continue to regulate the policy of open entry and exit; ensure the issuing and 
redeeming of cooperative shares to members; ensure payments to producers are received 
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within 30 days of product receipt; and finally ensure no special treatment is given to 
members based on seniority (Evens, 2004). 
It is important to note that Fonterra also plays a significant role in the exporting of 
nonfat dry milk powder (NFDMP) produced in the United States (Jesse, et al, 2008). 
Starting in 2005, when a worldwide shortage of dry milk protein occurred, the United 
States NFDMP exports began to increase rapidly (Jesse, et al, 2008). Under the United 
States Milk Price Support Program, the CCC historically purchased a majority of the 
NFDM produced domestically (Jesse, et al, 2008). This provided a stability in producing 
NFDMP not seen in the manufacturing of other dairy products. This stability lead too 
many cooperatives investing in NFDMP plants in order to service the CCC, and thus 
have a more stable market (Jesse, et al, 2008). As a vast majority of the dairy 
cooperatives in the United States are members of the federal cooperative, Dairy America, 
when the worldwide dry milk protein shortage occurred the focused shifted to servicing 
global market needs (Jesse, et al, 2008). As Fonterra controlled a significant portion of 
the international dairy export market, Dairy America formed a joint venture with Fonterra 
in 2005 (Jesse, et al, 2008). This joint venture contracts Fonterra to handle all of Dairy 
America’s exports (Jesse, et al, 2008). The joint venture does not ensure a set volume of 
NFDMP for the CME spot market, as the primary function of Dairy America is to service 
the export market to meet international needs for NFDMP (Jesse, et al, 2008). Dairy 
America has been widely criticized for this enterprise due to the impacts felt in the 
domestic NFDMP market (Jesse, et al, 2008).  
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Chapter 3 
PROPOSAL 
Auction Proposal 
Today all industries, agriculture included, have to adapt to the reality and impact 
of globalization. The products produced by California Agriculture no longer affect only 
those living throughout the Unites States, but impact people living around the globe. As 
the markets have become globalized, it has made apparent the need for regulatory change 
in order to effectively adapt to the new market scope. The California dairy industry is 
currently regulated by systems that began development in the 1920’s during a time of 
localized markets. To enable California to step onto the global stage free of these out of 
date regulation there are benefits to reap in adopting a new system which removes the 
end product pricing system, and that removes the current quota system. The formation of 
a dairy industry regulator system which is market driven in California will develop 
healthy competition for raw milk, encourage  farm and processing efficiency, create 
production based on market demand not government subsidy, and it will provide clear 
market demand signals to all facets of the industry. 
Currently California produces the largest volume of milk in the United States, and 
when rank against all foreign countries’ 2012 production, California is the eight largest 
producer of dairy in the world. Despite this impressive level of production, California 
continues to have opportunities for dairy industry expansion. California’s coastal location 
enables the California dairy industry to use maritime shipping to supply the world with 
dairy products in a cost effective way. These strategic advantages place California’s dairy 
industry in a position of great power and great opportunity. To seize this opportunity 
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there needs to be significant change within the California dairy industry. This change has 
the potential to allow California to enter into world markets that are currently being left 
unsatisfied. As the European Union international dairy market’s influence has begun 
shrinking, the international supply and the international demand for dairy products 
continues to grow, and the need for international dairy players increases. According to 
the United States Department of Agriculture, in order to meet the increasing demand for 
dairy products worldwide, dairy production will need to increase between 1.65% and 
2.45% annually year-over-year on an ongoing basis (USDA, 2014). 
It is important to remember that change is something that is both inevitable and 
challenging. Change is upon California, whether it be in the form of further regulation of 
the current system, or in adopting a new system. Inherently, as with any change, there are 
going to be individuals who support the change and those who do not. It is important to 
realize that working to please and save everyone in the dairy industry is impossible, and 
in fact could lead to irreversible damage to the entire California dairy industry. It is 
important that the governing bodies do what is best for the industry as a whole. It is 
inevitable that there will be those who win and those who lose in the transition.   
In order to capitalize on the enormous global opportunity on the horizon, I believe 
that the California dairy industry needs to adopt a new system similarly to one of the 
proposals featured in the 2007 McKinsey report. The adoption of a Dutch Auction 
Marketing System will enable the California dairy industry to thrive, and to become a 
global market leader. This system is based on a two milk classifications, fluid and 
manufacturing. As discussed below, the division of fluid milk and manufacturing milk 
will enable the California dairy industry to continue to provide an adequate supply of 
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quality fluid milk to the market without competing with other dairy products for raw 
milk. By lumping all manufactured dairy processors into one class, the system will 
promote production of processed products in accordance with consumer demands. 
The Auction System allows for hundred weights of raw milk (units of milk) to be 
sold in a stock market style system. On the Monday of the final full week of each month 
for a twenty four hour period, the California Department of Agriculture (CDFA) would 
open an electronic database in which every California dairy producer or their 
representative body would report their projected month’s production. This projection will 
include the producers contracted quota milk, and any production not under contracted 
quota (contracted quota discussed later). Simultaneously, all fluid dairy producers would 
enter a database and report the volume of milk which they desire to purchase at the set 
fluid price (fluid price discussed later). The CDFA will then distribute the month’s supply 
contracts to all fluid processors based on the submitted utilization projections. By 
providing fluid processors the opportunity to purchase as many units of raw milk as 
desired from the statewide milk supply before opening the market to the dairy 
manufacturing class, the system ensures consumers an adequate fluid milk supply.  
Upon the removal of the fluid milk allocation from the statewide pool, the CDFA 
will now allocate the remaining milk to the manufacturing class processors. The 
following day, again for a twenty four hour period, all dairy processors in California 
servicing a non-fluid market will enter a database in which they report the number of raw 
milk units they would like to purchase in a given price range. This system will allow 
manufactures to place a higher or lower value on different volumes of raw milk units 
based on their individual manufacturing requirements and an overall market reality.  
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By ranking all manufacturing class bids for units of milk in order from highest to 
lowest the CDFA will determine what unit value will clear the entirety of the projected 
month’s milk pool. If this unit value is level to or less than what an individual processor 
bid per unit of raw milk, then the processor will be required to pay for each bid upon milk 
unit at that price which clears the market. If a manufacture bid at a price per unit lower 
than the unit value price which clears the market the processor will receive an electronic 
notice stating the market cleaning price per unit for the month and is then given the 
option to purchase units at this higher price. The processor will have twelve hours to 
respond to the CDFA with the number of units which they would be willing to purchase 
at the reported price. The CDFA will then take these volume requests and allocate the 
remaining milk in the pool to those processors. If the pool does not have sufficient 
volume remaining to meet the requested units, then the processors will receive as many 
units as can be supplied.   
This bidding system will ensure that raw milk moves to its highest valued and 
best use within the manufacturing class. The Auction System enables healthy competition 
for milk throughout the manufacturing sector, as a processor must be willing and 
financially able to bid at a sufficient unit price to obtain milk or their plants will be 
processing below capacity or remaining ideal, which is very costly. To avoid processor 
collusion regarding the price per unit of milk, the taskforce (discussed below) will set a 
minimum bidding price per unit of milk. This base price will be derived from and set in 
relation to the average cost of production, and will be review by the taskforce annually. 
The price per unit of milk received by a producers for contracted quota milk, 
would be determined monthly by the unit price at which the market cleared. Each 
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producer would be paid in accordance with the number of units of milk they provided to 
the statewide pool regardless of which class their milk services. Those producers who 
produced over their contracted quota, are paid for the over production at the reduced 
value established by the CDFA. How the CDFA establishes the reduced price for milk 
produced above contracted quota is detailed later in this proposal.  
Today many processors have adopted a system of premium payment in order to 
attract milk with desirable components and quality for the products they manufacture. 
This practice is one that under the Auction System would still be possible through private 
side contracting. With all California milk production entering the statewide utilization 
pool for auctioning, private contracts for components and quality would be complex. The 
Auction System would leave no guarantee that a given processor would obtain the needed 
units of milk to receive milk from the producers with whom they have private premium 
contracts. This reality would need to be addressed in the development of the private 
contracts at the discretion of the producer and processors. Such contacting would 
continue to allow premiums to be paid if a producer supplies a better suited product to the 
individual processors need. 
 The price paid per unit of raw milk for fluid production would be set by the 
California Department of Food and Agriculture through field research. Conducting a 
yearly survey of consumer prices for fluid milk throughout the state, the CDFA would be 
able to develop a statewide average price per unit of consumer ready fluid milk to serve 
as a baseline. This baseline would then be used to establish the minimum price for units 
of raw milk purchased on the auction. The CDFA would adjust the baseline price each 
year in accordance with fluctuations in the prices paid by consumers, for changes in milk 
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consumption, and for changes in cost of fluid production. The baseline would serve as a 
price floor which no fluid milk could be sold below by a retailer, but no ceiling would be 
set. Along with establishing the base price, a regulatory component would be developed 
to ensure that fluid milk retailers paid processors based on a set percentage of revenues 
received per unit of milk. Unlike in today’s system, by tying the regulation to a 
percentage of revenues, the CDFA will ensure that both the retailers and processors share 
the profits and market fluctuations equally.  
 Under the current system California producers who hold quotas essentially own 
milk stocks. The producer has received or purchased the right to a premium price per 
hundredweight of milk equal to the quota they own. This quota can be bought, sold, and 
traded in a similar manor to stocks. Under the Auction System, today’s quota system 
would no longer exist. The current system of quota would be phased out through a five 
year plan similar to that seen in the European Union CAP reform. Producers who own 
quota under the current system would be compensated for the loss of investment over a 
period of five years. One possible option for producers is to choose to invest the 
equivalent value of their quota in things such as facility renovation or expansion. Another 
potential option is for producers to receive contracts allowing for herd expansion 
equivalent to the volume of milk cover by their current quota holdings. These contracts 
would guarantee that all expansion contracted in this manner would receive contracted 
quota under the new system. Both of these options would promote efficacy and expansion 
to the California dairy industry which is essential for success on the global stage. These 
are two possible solutions, but further research would be required to understand if these 
or other options would best benefit the entire industry.  
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The new system of contracted quota would be implemented based on the volume 
of milk each producer within the state is currently producing. Herds undergoing 
expansion currently would receive contracted quota for the volume of milk being 
produced in the six months prior to the issuing of the contracts. Producers not undergoing 
expansion would be allocated contracted quota based on the previous year’s production. 
Contracted quota is the number of raw milk units a producer is allowed to produce and 
still receive the statewide pool price for each unit produced. A producer would be 
allowed to produce more than their contracted quota, but the producer would receive less 
than the statewide pool’s value for each unit of over production. The CDFA would 
establish a set value which would be subtracted from the market clearing unit value of 
raw milk in order to establish a consistent penalty system.  The subtracted value would be 
between 20% and 35% of the market clearing value. The exact penalty percentage would 
be determined by such factors as the producer’s number of over production offenses in 
the given year and the volume of over production. A processor bidding on the over 
produced milk units would still be required to pay the same unit price as all other milk in 
the market. The difference between what the processor pays and what the producer 
receives will be collected by the CDFA to provide funding for dairy industry 
improvements. 
The system of contracted quota would ensure that producers are not incentivized 
to produce more milk than was needed by the demands of the processing sector. If the 
market was to experience an increased demand in the processing sector for units of raw 
milk, more contracted quota could be issued by the CDFA. These quota expansions 
 54 
would be granted to those who have requested an increased contract, and who have been 
deemed by the CDFA to have adequate facilities for such expansion. 
 Today in California the organic dairy industry is growing substantially, and it is 
gaining a significant consumer following. The niche market of servicing and consuming 
organically raised milk will also be traded through the proposed Auction System 
described above.  Organic producers, processors, and fluid retailers will utilize a separate 
pool and set fluid price based on the organic market.  
Both throughout the transition period and in the years to follow, it is essential to 
develop a monitoring system for the industry as a whole. Through the formation of an 
industry taskforce this need can easily and effectively be met. The taskforce will be 
responsible for meeting annually to discuss the dairy industry and how various 
components of the industry are faring. At each annual meeting the taskforce will 
determine the health of the dairy industry and its governing systems. If the taskforce feels 
that to maintain stability and order there is a potential need for intervention within the 
industry, then meetings will ensue to evaluate and provide potential solutions.  
The taskforce would consist of individuals representing each facet of the dairy 
industry. The need for a minimum of two processors, one from each the fluid and the 
manufacturing classes, and ideally representing a different array of processed products 
and markets. A minimum of two producers, one representing an individually marketed 
farm and the other representing a cooperative. The taskforce should also have individuals 
who are connected to international trade regulation, the California Department of 
Agriculture, and the California Dairy Commission.  
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This taskforce will consist of seven or more individuals, always representing an 
odd number of members to provide a tie breaker in voting situations. The individuals on 
the taskforce will be selected through a committee within the CDFA dairy division. 
Individuals can apply or be nominated as potential taskforce members. The 
application/nomination process will include written explanation of the individual’s 
qualification, industry association, and other such relevant information. The CDFA 
committee will review applicants and conduct further screening of candidates through 
interviews and other means as necessary.  
When an individual is brought forth to represent any given chair on the taskforce, 
they will be committing to a minimum of five years and no more than ten years of 
service. The service periods of the individual’s terms on the taskforce will need to be on a 
rotational schedule to ensure that no more than three representatives change in any given 
year. These term limits placed on the taskforce will ensure three things. First, the 
taskforce will have adequate time to develop a team dynamic. Second, individuals will 
achieve a level of comfort in voicing the opinions of the facets they represent. Finally, by 
limiting the term to ten years the taskforce is guaranteed to have systematic introduction 
of new, fresh views from the industry entering the evaluation process.  
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Chapter 4 
DYSFUNCTIONS AND OTHER PROPOSALS 
Current Industry Dysfunctions 
The Auction System would replace many of the regulatory systems that are in 
place today. With the termination of end product pricing, quota, and the current form of 
pooling, the California dairy industry will eliminate many of the systems that inhibit the 
market today. Today the California dairy industry suffers from a regulatory structure 
which causes a variety of issues including:  lack of healthy competition in the industry, 
lack of incentive to move milk to its highest and best use, lack of transparency between 
market supply and demand, lack of price discovery, lack of incentive to innovate, lack of 
risk management tools, continuous price volatility, and lack of controlled expansion.  
The current regulatory system does not allow for healthy competition between 
producer and other producers, or between processors and other processors. As each 
producer receives the same market price for each hundred weight of milk regardless of 
quality or components there is no incentive to improve raw product. If a producer invests 
in improving the milk quality and components of his milk, whether that be through 
targeted genetics programs or management practices, they are not directly rewarded in for 
these efforts under the current system. A producer with higher bacteria counts, lower fat 
levels, and lower protein levels will receive the same price as a producer with far superior 
numbers. Under a system where one is not paid for good management which is costly to 
implement, what incentive is there for a producer to adopt good management practices. It 
is important to again note that some processors are now privately contracting and paying 
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producers for milk quality and components levels that best suit their individual 
processing needs, but this is a practice of choice and is not mandated.  
The lack of competition between processors is a problem that in of itself creates 
many other problems for the industry. As a processor’s minimal margins are set by the 
make allowance built into the End Product Pricing formulas, a processor has no incentive 
to compete for raw milk. Processors producing a product which is receiving a very low 
value on the market will still receive their minimal margin for each unit produced even if 
it is beyond the market’s needs. Thus a processor is not incentivized to lower production 
and redistribute their contracted milk to other higher demand products under this 
guaranteed margin system. For a processor producing a product under high demand and 
drawing a high market price, there is no system to allow for competitive bidding for more 
units of raw milk. The processor producing the highly demanded product is still allocated 
the same volume of milk their contracted producers can supply regardless of the 
increased demand for the end product. The lack of incentive to move milk to its highest 
and best use inhibits processors from competing for milk which leads to surplus of lesser 
demanded and valued products, as well as, shortages of highly demanded and valued 
products. By eliminating the make allowance, processors will be incentivized to allow 
milk to flow to sectors of high demand.  
The narrow focus of the End Product Pricing formulas provides processors 
limited opportunity to manage risk when processing products not specifically tied into 
End Product Pricing. The End Product Pricing formulas utilize commodity values 
reported by the CME to establish processor payments for all dairy products to the pool 
regardless of what dairy product they produce. As the CME is the domestic spot market 
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for only cheddar cheese and butter, the End Product Pricing formulas are far from 
representative of all dairy products produced. As the End Product Pricing formulas focus 
on only these two commodities, it is difficult for processors not producing cheddar cheese 
or butter to manage changes in the price of the commodity which they are actually 
producing. When a processor produces any product that is not utilized directly by the 
minimum price formulas, they increase their marginal risk as the fluctuations in the value 
of the product they produce is not guaranteed to be in accordance with the CME 
commodity by which the price is established. It is also difficult for processors servicing 
the international market to have their payments price tied to domestic value of the 
commodity.  
With no incentive to compete for milk, with a set minimum margin, and with the 
lack of risk management for processors, the dairy industry suffers from a significant 
reduction in processors willingness to innovate. The high cost and risk associated with 
innovation and product development has led to a limiting of the California dairy industry. 
Although some processors still choose to build processing facilities capable of the further 
processing to produce value added products, such as whey protein and isolates, it is risky. 
The current systems do not encourage or protect a processor producing value added 
products as the pricing formulas and make allowance do not include such products. The 
absence of incentive to innovate has made it so California dairy production covers a 
narrow spectrum of products, many of which are demanded in a very limited capacity 
worldwide. 
Under the End Product Pricing system producers are forced to bare the majority 
of the dairy markets fluctuations. The End Product Pricing formulas are established by 
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numerous factors, but do not consider the price of raw milk production. The formulas 
ensure all processors minimum return margin based on the established make allowance, 
but the formulas provide no such security for producers. Although a processor can 
experience increased margins when commodity prices are high, the make allowance 
ensures processors will have a significant percentage their cost of production covered. 
This safety net is inherent in the End Product Pricing formulas. When commodity prices 
fall the amount which processors pay into the state wide pool falls leading to a reduction 
in the statewide pool. This reduction in turn lowers the value of each hundred weight of 
milk in the pool, lowering producer payments and forcing producers to bare the cost of 
market fluctuations. As seen during the economic down turn of 2009, the prices received 
by producers can fall far below their cost of production, and the current system provides 
producers with limited resources to raise their milk price to at least break even with costs 
of production. The government raw milk price supports are set at a value per hundred 
weight far below the cost of production making the support system virtually useless for 
producers. The current system’s unequal sharing of market risk forces producers to bare 
virtually all the market fluctuations while protecting processors profitability. 
Under the current system which pays each producer based on their individual 
contribution to the statewide pool, the only way outside of private contracts for a 
producer to increase profits is to increase production. By producing a larger volume of 
milk a producer will receive a larger monthly milk check reflective of this increased 
volume. The main issue with this system is its ability to encourage over production of 
raw milk. As the system pays only on total production and raw milk is guaranteed a home 
in cooperatives, many producers choose to expand their herds to increase farm revenues. 
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This in turn floods the raw milk market with surplus milk, and that leads to lower 
producer milk prices on a per unit basis. By adopting a system which pays producers 
based on the demand for milk, the dairy industry will be able to send clear market signals 
regarding production expansion or contraction in response to market demands. This 
transparency in supply and demand will enable producers to receive a more stable milk 
price per unit and avoid production of surplus milk. 
 
Other Industry Proposals  
As outlined above the California dairy industry is suffering from the unintended 
consequences of the current regulatory system. It is apparent that regulatory change is 
needed for the success of the California dairy industry. Today there are many proposed 
solutions to the problems plaguing the California dairy industry. I will briefly highlight 
the three proposed solutions most widely discussed today, and address the disadvantages 
inherent in each of the proposed solutions. 
 First, the idea of adopting a two class market system influenced by end product 
payments into the pool is widely debated today, and it is perhaps the second best option 
for the California dairy industry. With the formation of a fluid milk class and a 
manufacturing milk class, many of the issues of today’s multiclass regulatory system 
would be relieved. Having only two classes of milk would promote healthy competition 
among processors biding for raw milk, and in turn would lead to more clarity in market 
demand signals. The two class system would also ensure fluid milk continues to receive 
milk in quantities sufficient to adequately meet market demands. The two market system 
would not address the current issues being faced due to end product pricing formulas, 
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milk quota, or the lack of innovation. For this reason I believe it is unwise for California 
to adopt the two market dairy system with pool payments based on end product 
utilization. 
Second, if California chooses the path of increased regulation, the results should 
be similar to those that have been seen in Canada. The California dairy industry will 
likely see reduced competitiveness on the global market, and will be unable to expand to 
meet the international demands. Though examination of agricultural markets throughout 
the United States and Canada, it is also apparent that each layer of regulation added not 
only forces smaller entities out of business, but also drives larger companies to move to 
less regulated areas for production. It is vital for the survival of the California dairy 
industry for government to choose a path of minimized regulation to both save the small 
producers and processors, as well as, encourage continued large scale production and 
processing within the state. 
 Third, the widely discussed and seemingly popular idea of California moving to 
become part of the FMMOs is one that could ultimately destroy California’s competitive 
edge domestically. California’s greatest advantage in the domestic marketing of milk has 
been in the ability to maneuver the industry in ways outside of the FMMOs regulations. 
With this more flexible system, California has been able to overcome the extremely high 
regulatory fees and shipping disadvantages which would cripple the California dairy 
industry if California was to join the FMMO. With the FMMO regulations and policies 
currently in place, joining the FMMO would force California to compete on a level 
playing field with states with far lower regulatory and shipping costs. For California’s 
long term success, if the state were to join the FMMOs, it would be important to have 
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negotiated important policy exceptions to compensate for California’s higher regulatory 
and shipping costs. 
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Conclusions 
 Regardless of which system is adopted, policy changes that allow for risk 
management in accordance with both domestic and international market demands while 
avoiding signaling that promotes overproduction is very important for the future of the 
California dairy industry. Reforming the California dairy industry has the potential to 
provide the foundation needed for California dairy producers and processors to utilize 
their competitive advantage over the rest of the United States in capturing both the 
domestic and international dairy markets. 
It is necessary to note that transitioning to any proposed system is likely to push 
several more California dairies, as well as, many processors out of production. The 
reduction seen initially will allow only the most efficient and effective establishments to 
survive; thereby laying a stronger foundation for the industry to build from. I believe the 
adoption of the Auction System will allow California in the end to rise above all other 
markets, and to step into the position of global leader. 
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Appendix 1- Dairy System Production Comparative Chart  
 CA MMO Entire US IDAHO CANADA EU AU NZ 
Number of 
Cows 
1,819,760  9,233,000 580,000 1,400,000  22,600,000 1,650,000 4,780,000  
Number of 
Farms 
1,563 49,331 565 12,529 UNK 6, 398 11,891 
Average 
Number of 
Cows Per 
Farm 
1,164 
 
Varies 
greatly 
across 52 
States 
1,027 77 Varies 
greatly in 
the 28 
Member 
States 
258 Varies 
greatly in 
various 
regions 
Average 
Production 
Per Cow 
23,457 lbs 21,642 lbs 23,376 lbs 18,913 lbs 13,491 lbs 13,381 lbs 8,934 lbs 
Total 
Annual 
Production 
2012 
41,801 
million lbs 
 
199,648,576 
million lbs 
13,558 
million lbs 
18,628,870 
million lbs 
308,644,000 
million lbs 
22,079,069 
million lbs 
44,859,201 
million lbs 
Dairy Farmers of Canada. 2014. Our Contribution. Accessed March 3, 2014. http://www.dairyfarmers.ca/what-we-do/our-
economic-contribution. 
Progressive Dairymen. 2012 U.S. Dairy Stats. Accessed January 13, 2014.  
http://www.progressivepublish.com/downloads/2013/general/2013_pd_stats_highres.pdf. 
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Appendix 2 – Comparative Chart of Dairy System Realities 
 CA MMO FMMO IDAHO CANADA EU NZ AU  
Ability For 
International Market 
Influence Expansion 
Limited, due to 
regulations & 
lack of 
processing 
capabilities 
Limited, need 
processing able to 
meet global 
specifications  
UNK Limited, due to 
government caps 
on expansion  
Limited currently, 
but upon reform 
will emerge very 
strong & able to 
meet global 
demands 
Limited, due to 
seasonal 
production & 
inability for 
great expansion 
Limited, due to 
seasonal 
production & 
inability for 
great expansion 
Subsidized Yes Yes UNK Yes, Heavily Yes, but 
decreasing  
Yes No 
Domestic- Market 
Demand 
Responsiveness 
Limited Limited UNK High Limited Limited Limited 
International- Market 
Demand 
Responsiveness 
Limited Moderate UNK Very Low Moderate High High 
Government Control 
(High, Mid, Low) 
Medium  Medium UNK High High, but 
decreasing 
High Low 
Ability To Increase 
Production And 
Processing 
Yes Yes UNK No Yes, but 
minimally 
No No 
Market Transparency 
& Price Transmission 
Down The Food 
Chain 
Limited Limited UNK No Limited Limited Yes 
Active Competition 
Between Processors 
Limited Limited UNK No No No Yes 
Healthy Competition 
Between Producers 
No No UNK No No No Yes 
Ability To Service 
Markets (Based On 
Geographical 
Location & Shipping 
Cost) 
High High, regional UNK Low Medium High High 
System Which 
Encourage Innovation 
Low Low UNK Low Medium High High 
Market Risks Bared 
By (Producer, 
Processor, Both, or 
Government) 
Producer Both UNK Government Government Both Both 
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Appendix 3 – Basic USA Standard and Metric to Standard Conversion Chart 
 
USA Standard  
1 Pound  1 Pound 
1 Gallon 8.6 Pounds 
1 Hundred Weight (i.e. CWT) 100 Pounds 
1 Ton 2000 Pounds 
 
Metric  Standard 
1 Liter   0.264172 Gallons 
1 Kilogram (i.e. kg) 2.20462 Pounds 
1 Metric Tonnes  1.10231 Ton 
